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ABSTRACT
Employer-provided benefits are a large and growing share of compensation costs. In this paper, I
consider three factors that can affect the value created by employer-sponsored benefits. First, firms
have a comparative advantage (for example, due to scale economies or tax treatment) in purchasing
relative to employees. This advantage can vary across firms based on size and other differences in
cost structure. Second, employees differ in their valuations of benefits and it is costly for workers
to match with firms that offer the benefits they value. Finally, some benefits can reduce the marginal
cost to an employee of extra working time. I develop a simple model that integrates these factors.
I then generate empirical implications of the model and use data from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth to test these implications. I examine access to employer-provided meals, child-care,
dental insurance, and health insurance. I also study how benefits are grouped together and differences
between benefits packages at for-profit, not-for-profit, and government employers. The empirical
analysis provides evidence consistent with all three factors in the model contributing to firms'
decisions about which benefits to offer.
Paul Oyer





pauloyer@stanford.edu“Concierge services, petsitting, nap rooms and the option to telecommute are really just
sneaky new ways to get already overworked employees to toil even harder, says Jill Andresky
Fraser, author of White-Collar Sweatshop. ‘These perks are often illusory. They exist just for
their publicity value,’ she says. ‘In reality, staﬀ face resentment if they try to work from home
or take family days. And free food, nap rooms and home computers just keep people tied to
their work.’” — Economist (2001)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Signiﬁcant eﬀort has gone into the economic analysis of ﬁrms’ choices about what to make and
what to buy. Economists have also often considered when parties to a transaction exchange goods
and services rather than one side simply purchasing from the other with currency. The provision
of employee beneﬁt s ,w h i c ha r eal a r g ea n dg r o w i n gp o r t i on of employment costs, is driven by
both the make or buy decision and non-monetary barter. The most widely discussed employer-
sponsored beneﬁt is health insurance, but some employers also provide dental care, subsidized or
free beverages and meals, subsidized or free child care, discounts on the ﬁrms’ products, and even
in-oﬃce massages.1 Given the wide use of non-cash compensation, it must be the case that these
workplace beneﬁts create economic beneﬁts that cannot be captured if employees make all their
own consumption choices.2 In this paper, I model potential sources of this value and explore these
sources empirically.
As modeled by Rosen (1974) and others, beneﬁts can create value in the employment relationship
when ﬁrms can purchase goods and services more cost eﬀectively than employees. That is, the
ﬁrm acts as a buyers’ club for its employees with much of the potential cost advantage of this
arrangement driven by tax treatment of beneﬁts. I develop a model that adds two elements to
this “tax/buyers’ club” explanation of employee beneﬁts. First, I consider the potential costs of
matching employees who value certain beneﬁts with ﬁrms that can procure them eﬃciently. I add
an element of search costs to a model where employees have heterogeneous tastes and the ﬁrm
cannot price discriminate (in the sense of tying compensation to beneﬁts consumption.) In this
case, hiring workers at random would reduce or eliminate the value created by employer-provided
1In this paper, I only consider non-monetary beneﬁts. I do not analyze why and how ﬁrms choose among forms of
ﬁn a n c i a lc o m p e n s a t i o n( t h a ti s ,c a s h ,s t o c k ,o rp r o ﬁt sharing), nor do I look at the timing of pay (such as retirement
beneﬁts.)
2This sentence suggests the potential confusion when looking at an economic model of employee beneﬁts given the
natural tendency to discuss marginal costs versus marginal beneﬁts. Hereafter, I use the term beneﬁts solely to refer
to non-cash employee compensation and use other terms when referring to economic beneﬁts more generally.
1beneﬁts, so the ﬁrm trades oﬀ the cost of ﬁnding employees that value the beneﬁts it can provide
eﬃciently against its procurement cost advantage.
As long as employee preferences are reasonably ﬁxed, the “tax/buyers’ club” model, with or
without search costs, suggests that beneﬁts packages will be stable over time. The second innovation
in the model, on the other hand, helps explain the fact that many beneﬁts are sensitive to the
business cycle.3 I consider the possibility that certain beneﬁts are provided as a means of reducing
employees’ cost of eﬀort. When the marginal product of labor is high, the employer may want to
encourage the worker to extend his work week. Assuming the employee’s cost of eﬀort is convex in
hours worked, the employer is trying to buy additional hours that are very costly to the employee.
By oﬀering beneﬁts such as meals, entertainment options at the workplace, and errand services,
employers lower the employee’s cost of eﬀort. That is, by helping the employee subcontract some
of his personal duties to a party that can execute these duties at lower cost, the employer can free
more time for the employee to engage in high value tasks.
I derive a simple model that integrates these various factors that may lead ﬁrms to oﬀer beneﬁts.
The model generates several testable implications, which I explore using data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). In 1979, the NLSY interviewed 12,686 people born between
1957 and 1964. When possible, these same individuals were interviewed annually through 1994
and bi-annually through 2000. From 1985-2000, the NLSY included questions about fringe beneﬁts
at the person’s main job. I use these data to perform empirical analysis in three stages. First, I
examine factors associated with ﬁrms’ providing individual beneﬁts, including employer-provided
or employer-subsidized meals, child care, dental insurance, and health insurance. Second, I look at
how these beneﬁts are combined with other oﬀerings to form beneﬁts “packages” that are likely to
either attract certain types of workers or help lower the cost of employee eﬀort. Finally, I compare
the beneﬁts policies of employers in the for-proﬁt, not-for-proﬁt, and government sectors to see if
the variation is consistent with expected diﬀerences in attributes of employers and workers in these
sectors.
I ﬁnd results that are consistent with the implications of the model. I show that employer-
sponsored beneﬁts are associated with factors that proxy for employers’ costs and employees’ tastes.
For example, larger ﬁrms, which can gain greater scale economies in beneﬁts purchasing, are more
likely to provide all beneﬁts. Firms are more likely to provide beneﬁts related to their industry,
suggesting they provide beneﬁts when they can create them at low cost. It appears people sort to
ﬁrms based on their demand for beneﬁts. For example, similar to prior work, I show that people
3For anecdotal discussions of discontinuation of beneﬁts when economic conditions weaken, see Economist (2001)
and Raghavan (2003).
2with families are signiﬁcantly more likely to hold jobs with employer-provided health insurance. I
also show that sorting extends to other beneﬁts such as child care and on-the-job meals.
The correlation between hours of work and some beneﬁts is highly supportive of these beneﬁts
l o w e r i n gt h ec o s to fe ﬀort. All beneﬁts are more likely for full-time workers than for part-time
workers. However, employees who work particularly long hours are signiﬁcantly more likely to have
employer-provided meals than other full-time workers. This relationship between long hours and
beneﬁts does not hold for beneﬁts that would seem less naturally complementary to eﬀort such
as dental care and health care. Also, it seems likely that employer-provided child care can help
lower the costs of switching from part-time to full-time but that people who work very long hours
prefer not to keep their children at the workplace. The evidence is consistent with this notion,
as employer-provided child care is signiﬁcantly more likely for full-time workers than part-time
workers. However, employees who work particularly long hours are less likely to have employer-
provided child care than those who work standard full-time hours.
The model’s implications are also consistent with the empirical analysis of beneﬁts “packages.”
I show that people who work long hours are relatively likely to receive a package of beneﬁts that
lower the cost of eﬀort, including meals, parking, and ﬂexible time. I also show that workers who
are likely to be seeking stable employment relationships are more likely to get a package of beneﬁts
that the ﬁrm can purchase eﬃciently but that do not aﬀect the cost of eﬀort.
The ﬁnal set of empirical results shows interesting patterns in beneﬁts packages across diﬀerent
types of employment classes. I show that government employers are much less likely than for-
proﬁt companies to provide beneﬁts that lower the cost of eﬀort. Government and not-for-proﬁt
employers are much more likely to provide a package of beneﬁts that might be valued by employees
interested in long-term employment relationships. Self-employed workers show the exact opposite
pattern, however. This is consistent with government and non-proﬁt employees being risk averse
and seeking stable employment without long hours while self-employed workers try to lower the
burden of working hard.
The theory and the empirical evidence lead to the conclusion that the optimal compensation
package can be aﬀected by numerous factors. As a result, ﬁrms get involved in the procurement of
various products and services that are only related to their business because of employee preferences.
Due to variations in labor market conditions, income tax structure, and purchasing economies, it
is often eﬃcient for ﬁrms to expand their scope into creating employment packages rather than
simply engaging in cash-only transactions with workers.
This paper builds on a large existing theoretical and empirical literature on employer-provided
beneﬁts. Rosen (1986) surveys the theoretical and empirical work on compensating diﬀerentials
3in the labor market. He outlines a model where employees sort eﬃciently and costlessly to the
employer that oﬀers the beneﬁts they value most. As he and Brown (1980) discuss, it is very
diﬃcult to measure the “price” of employee beneﬁts in terms of lowering wages.4 To avoid this
issue, I primarily analyze the existence of beneﬁts rather than the exact salary trade-oﬀ.F o r a
more recent survey, focusing on employer-sponsored health insurance, see Gruber (2000).
The paper makes several novel contributions to this literature. First, by adding search costs
to prior models of workplace beneﬁts, I derive a relationship between beneﬁts and job tenure.
Second, to my knowledge, the only other work on the relationship between beneﬁts and eﬀort is
a contemporaneous paper by Rajan and Wulf (2005). Their focus is quite diﬀerent, however, as
they analyze senior executives, large ﬁrms, and “perks” such as company jets, chauﬀer service, and
country club membership. Third, while the bulk of prior work studies health insurance (probably
because it is such a large cost), I focus on a broader set of beneﬁts that can provide more insight
into a greater variety of motivations for employers to sponsor workplace beneﬁts. Though not as
large as health-related beneﬁts, some of these beneﬁts, such as workplace meals and child-care,
are growing in prevalence and have become large markets. Finally, my ﬁndings on diﬀerences in
beneﬁts policies between for-proﬁt companies and other types of employers are novel and may
inform understanding of diﬀerences among employer classes.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I develop a model of employer-
provided beneﬁts that incorporates several factors that can aﬀect the optimal salary/beneﬁtm i xa n d
derive testable empirical implications of the model. Section 3 tests the model’s implications using
self-reported data on individuals’ work-related beneﬁts. I conclude and discuss the implications of
the analysis for ﬁrms and policy makers in Section 4.
2 A Model of Employer-Provided Beneﬁts
In this section, I develop a simple model of a ﬁrm’s optimal mix of compensation between salary
and employer-sponsored beneﬁts. I focus on four factors that may aﬀect the salary/beneﬁts trade-
oﬀ: heterogeneity across ﬁrms in the cost of providing beneﬁts, heterogeneity across employees in
their relative preferences for money and beneﬁts, costs to ﬁrms of ﬁnding workers that will accept
the compensation packages they oﬀer, and the possibility that some beneﬁts may lower the cost of
work-related eﬀort. I brieﬂy motivate consideration of each of these four factors. Then I develop
the formal model that integrates these eﬀects and discuss the model’s empirical implications.
4See Olson (2002) and Thaler and Rosen (1975) for evidence that workers pay for health insurance and job safety,
respectively, through lower wages.
4Employers can be eﬃcient providers of goods and services for their employees for several rea-
sons.5 First, people interact regularly at work, so the marginal costs of organizing group buying
is lowered there. Also, ﬁrms may attract people with similar tastes, enabling larger purchases.
Perhaps most importantly, there can be substantial tax advantages to some beneﬁts being provided
by ﬁrms relative to paying employees more money and letting them purchase goods with after-tax
income.
The eﬃciency of beneﬁts is also aﬀected by diﬀerences across individuals in their taste for
beneﬁts. For example, those workers who do not drink coﬀee will not accept a wage discount in
exchange for employer-provided coﬀee. But, if ﬁrms can ﬁnd employees who value the beneﬁts they
oﬀer, then they can lower their total compensation expenses.
Given the heterogeneity of ﬁrms and employees, random assignment of employees to ﬁrms would
not allow ﬁrms to maximize the eﬃciency of beneﬁts. That is, in the absence of being able to price
discriminate by lowering individuals’ salaries according to their taste for beneﬁts, ﬁrms and workers
have to expend resources searching for appropriate matches.
While the discussion to this point has focused on the trade-oﬀ between salary and beneﬁts, there
is also a relationship between some beneﬁts and leisure. Consider a simple example. Some ﬁrms
provide “concierge services” to their employees.6 These services help employees to subcontract out
some of the necessities of their personal lives so that they can engage in higher value activities at
work. That is, by taking care of details in people’s personal lives such as laundry, shopping, and
even planning children’s birthday parties, concierge services lower employees’ cost of eﬀort.
To see how these issues relate to one another in a more formal context, consider a labor market
where ﬁrms contract with workers who provide a set of tasks (or level of eﬀort) e. Firms capture
revenue of θe per period of an employment relationship. There is no hidden action problem, so
ﬁrms oﬀer a package of wages, beneﬁts, and eﬀort, (w,b,e), to potential employees. b is the dollars
per employee that the ﬁrm spends on beneﬁts. Firms vary in how eﬃciently they can spend their
beneﬁts dollars. Let N be a parameter that captures ﬁrm heterogeneity in the cost of providing
ab e n e ﬁt. N is increasing in the amount of beneﬁts a given ﬁrm can purchase with each dollar
it expends. It is convenient to think of N as the number of employees at the ﬁrm (where N is
exogenously determined.) However, N can also be such factors as how closely a beneﬁt is related
to products the ﬁrm is already producing. For example, a ski resort can presumably provide lift
5See Rice (1966) and Woodbury (1983) for early discussions of the potential eﬃciency of employer-sponsored
beneﬁts. Theoretical foundations can be found in Rosen (1974).
6Several companies, including Circles, VIPdesk.com, and Virtual Concierge, contract with employers to provide
these services to workers.
5tickets at relatively low cost to its employees (assuming there is at least some idle capacity on the
mountain), so ski resorts would have relatively high N if the relevant beneﬁti sl i f tt i c k e t s . A t
the time of hiring, each employee is expected to work for T periods. T is driven by such factors
as the nature of the work, the value of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, and the stability of employee
preferences.7
E m p l o y e e sv a r yi nh o wm u c hu t i l i t yt h e yd e r i v ef r o mb e n e ﬁts. In particular, person i derives
δiV (b,N) from the ﬁrm’s expenditure (b)o ne m p l o y e eb e n e ﬁts. Let δi be drawn from a distribu-
tion with density f(δ) and cumulative density F(δ). The function V incorporates representative
preferences, individual heterogeneity in preferences (through δ), and the relative eﬃciency of pur-
chasing on the part of the ﬁrm. That is, it is convenient analytically to capture the heterogeneity
of both workers and ﬁrms through the representation of the individual’s utility function. This also
allows the value of δiV (b,N) to be interpreted as a match-speciﬁc valuation of beneﬁts. But it is
important to bear in mind that b is the amount the ﬁrm spends on beneﬁts, while δiV (b,N) is the
amount the employee values those expenditures.
I make the following assumptions about the beneﬁts valuation function. People prefer more
beneﬁts to less, but the marginal value of additional beneﬁts is decreasing (that is, Vb ≥ 0 and
Vbb ≤ 0.) The purchasing advantages of employers (scale economies) are concave (that is, VN ≥ 0
and VNN ≤ 0.) Also, the marginal value to the employee of a dollar spent on beneﬁts is greater at
larger ﬁrms (that is, VbN ≥ 0.) Figure 1 graphs V as a function of b at two diﬀerent levels of N,
under these assumptions. In this example, if δi =1 , then any level of b such that V (b,N) is below
the 45-degree line is ineﬃcient because the ﬁrm is spending more on beneﬁts that it can “charge”
the employee through a wage discount.
The cost of eﬀort completes the employee’s utility function. An employee bears personal cost
of doing his job of c(e,b). Assume the standard convex cost of eﬀort (ce(e,b) > 0 and cee(e,b) > 0).
Now assume that beneﬁts lower the employees’ cost of eﬀort (cb(e,b) < 0). Most importantly, I
assume ceb(e,b) < 0. That is, the marginal cost of an extra unit of eﬀort is decreasing in beneﬁts.
This captures the notion that working late is less costly if dinner is provided, that working hard
all week is less costly when a concierge is provided, or even that working is less unpleasant when
attractive art is posted in the ﬁrm’s corridors.8
7One dimension on which people vary is how long they are likely to stay on the job. Beneﬁt sw o u l dt h e nh a v et h e
additional value of separating quitters from stayers, as in Salop and Salop (1976).
8Note that I assume that the complementarity between e and b is independent of the individual’s taste for beneﬁts
or the ﬁrm’s purchasing power. In reality, the complementarity would likely be increasing in δi and N.A l l o w i n gf o r
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Figure 1: Employee valuation of beneﬁts
The employee has an alternative job that pays w0 in cash with e =0 , so he accepts any (w,b,e)
combination such that w + δiV (b,N) − c(e,b) ≥ w0. All potential employees accept an oﬀer of
(w,b,e)=( w0,0,0). Ideally, the model would solve for w0 endogenously. That is, market wages
would be a function of ﬁrms’ beneﬁts cost structure and employee preferences for beneﬁts. Adding
this to the model would add a great deal of complication and require assumptions about the workers’
information when engaging in search. However, I believe the basic results and intuition would be
unchanged. One way to avoid concern over the exogenous market wage is to interpret the current
model as being about choices the employer makes regarding beneﬁts that other employers cannot
provide.
All else equal, the ﬁr mw a n t st ol o w e rc o s t so fe m p l o y m e n t ,w h i c hi tc a nd ob yﬁnding potential
employees with the highest values of δi. However, it is costly to search for such workers. To capture
this in the model, I assume that it costs m to oﬀer a job to an employee and that, at the time the
job is oﬀered, the ﬁrm does not know the employee’s preferences. As a result, the expected costs of




V (b,N)).T h eﬁrm sets the wage such that
w = w0 − δV(b,N)+c(e,b) (1)
for some critical δ.9
9Given the static nature of the model, the ﬁrm picks its beneﬁt sa n dt h e nw o r k e r s .I nr e a l i t y ,a sﬁrm strategies and
7The ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts over T periods, including both the costs of hiring and the annual
cost of compensation. Substituting for w using (1), this problem can be written
max
δ,b,e




The proﬁt function is quasisupermodular in (δ,b,e) and, given the assumptions of the model,
satisﬁes the single crossing property in (δ,b,e;T,N,−m). Therefore, Theorem 4 of Milgrom and
Shannon (1994) applies to the ﬁrm’s problem and I can state the following results. I do not provide
formal proofs, as they are derived from various simple cross-partial derivative calculations.
Implication 1: b and δ are increasing in N.
In words, a comparative advantage in purchasing a beneﬁth a st w oe ﬀects on a ﬁrm — it leads
the ﬁr mt op r o v i d em o r eo ft h a tb e n e ﬁt and it leads the ﬁrm to invest in ﬁnding employees who
v a l u et h a tb e n e ﬁt relatively highly. In the model, there is eﬃcient sorting between ﬁrms that can
cost-eﬀectively supply a beneﬁt and employees that value the beneﬁth i g h l y .
Implication 2: b and δ are positively correlated.
In the model, beneﬁts and strong tastes for beneﬁts are complements. That is, if a ﬁrm wants
to select people that have relatively high valuations for a certain beneﬁt, they will provide more of
that beneﬁt. This suggests that workers with a taste for a beneﬁtw i l ls o r tt oﬁrms that provide
that beneﬁt.
Implication 3: b and δ are increasing in T.
When ﬁrm/worker matches last longer, then any value that can be created by the use of beneﬁts
becomes larger relative to the costs of matching ﬁrms to workers. As a result, in longer employment
relationships, ﬁrms will want to oﬀer more beneﬁts and attempt to screen more carefully for workers
who will take large wage discounts for those beneﬁts.
Implication 4: e and b are positively correlated if ceb < 0.
Firms will provide more of the types of beneﬁts that lower the cost of eﬀort when they ask for
higher levels of eﬀort. Empirical tests of this implication require some judgment, as not all beneﬁts
are likely to lower the cost of eﬀort. For example, while concierge services may make it easier for
employees to stay at the oﬃce, it seems unlikely that an employer can lower the cost of employee
eﬀort by providing dental insurance.
Implications 1-4 are the key testable empirical hypotheses that I will analyze in the empirical
section below. The model does make additional predictions, though the NLSY data that I use will
cost structures evolve, ﬁrms change their beneﬁts plans to meet the tastes of the employees they already have. While
this might make the search aspects of the model a bit less important, it should not change the basic relationships or
implications.
8not allow me to test these directly. I now brieﬂy state and discuss these implications.
Implication 5: b and e are increasing in θ if ceb < 0.
When the marginal return to eﬀort is high, ﬁrms will ﬁnd it eﬃcient to provide more of the
beneﬁts that make it easier for the employee to exert eﬀort. The use of concierge services during
the boom of the late 1990’s, followed by a drop in the use of such services after the boom, is
consistent with this idea. During the good times, ﬁrms attempted to make high-value employees’
personal lives easier so they could stay late. But when long work weeks were no longer valuable,
ﬁrms let employees take care of their personal chores. This implication could, in principle, be tested
cross-sectionally because I would expect higher wage employees (where wage proxies for marginal
product) to receive more beneﬁts than lower-level employees. However, while this interpretation
will clearly be shown to be consistent with the data in the next section, it cannot be separated
from the idea that employees who value beneﬁts more (due to higher tax rates and due to lower
marginal utility for cash) are more likely to receive beneﬁts. That is, this implication cannot be
separated from Implication 2.
Implication 6: b and δ are decreasing in m.
Increased search costs have the opposite eﬀect of increasing expected length of the employment
relationship in that they make the costs of ﬁnding a person who values beneﬁts higher relative to
the value created by beneﬁts once the match is made. This suggests that lowering the costs to ﬁrms
of ﬁnding and screening workers would lead them to make beneﬁts a larger part of compensation.
Note that there is ample evidence regarding some of these implications in prior empirical studies
of employer-sponsored health insurance. Implication 2, which suggests that employees will sort to
ﬁrms based on beneﬁts, has been analyzed in the context of health insurance by Scott, Berger and
Black (1989), Dranove, Spier and Baker (2000), and Levy (1998). Scott et al. (1989) study the eﬀect
of Internal Revenue Service rules that require beneﬁts to be oﬀered on a nondiscriminatory basis
in order to qualify for tax exemption. They show that this has enhanced sorting of workers into
occupations that match their preferences (using income as a proxy.) Dranove et al. (2000) develop
a model where employers oﬀer health insurance due to cost and tax advantages, but, in order to
discourage over-consumption of this beneﬁt, require employees to make a contribution to insurance
premiums. This saves the ﬁrm some expense, at the cost of some eﬃciency in the total costs to the
ﬁrm and the workers, by encouraging some employees to utilize health insurance oﬀered by their
spouse’s employer. Levy (1998) draws similar conclusions by studying the relationship between
employee contributions and average age of a ﬁrm’s employees. I will perform similar analyses of
sorting in the health insurance context. However, I will also analyze the role of sorting workers
9through other beneﬁts that have not received as much attention in prior studies.10
As mentioned above, Implication 2 can be interpreted as suggesting a connection between
beneﬁts and taxes. This implication has also received support from prior studies of health insurance.
See, for example, Royalty (2000) and Gruber and Lettau (2004), who show that health insurance
provision is highly sensitive to tax rates. The results in Gruber and Lettau (2004) are also consistent
with economies of scale and, more speciﬁcally, with the assumption that VN > 0 because insurance
beneﬁts are, on average, signiﬁcantly higher at larger ﬁrms.
I have emphasized the ﬁrm’s purchasing eﬃciency and matching of employees with ﬁrms strictly
b a s e do ne m p l o y e et a s t e s .H o w e v e r ,aﬁrm could also use beneﬁts if employee tastes for a certain
beneﬁt are correlated with productivity at the ﬁrm. Consider, for example, a ﬁrm that felt the
most productive workers were those who were intellectually curious and valued education. In the
context of the model, this would imply a positive correlation between θ and δ.T h e ﬁrm might
oﬀer a tuition reimbursement beneﬁt, even in the absence of any tax or purchasing advantage, as
a means of inducing the most productive potential employees to signal their tastes (and, therefore,
their productivity.) While this suggests a somewhat diﬀerent model from the one I have outlined
(and one that is closely related to Salop and Salop (1976)), both emphasize the ﬁrm using beneﬁts
to sort on a certain type of worker. As a result, the empirical implications (at least those that
are testable) are quite similar. Therefore, at this point, I make no attempt to distinguish between
sorting strictly on preferences and using beneﬁts to sort on productivity.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
I use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The NLSY started with a
sample of 12,686 Americans who were between the ages of 14 and 21 in 1979. Every year from 1979
to 1994, and then in the years 1996, 1998, and 2000, those members of the original sample who
could be found and interviewed were asked many questions about employment and other issues.11
I use the 1985-2000 interviews because most respondents had become permanently attached to the
labor force by then and these are the years with the most questions related to employee beneﬁts.
The total NLSY sample size in these years varies from 10,894 to 8,033. However, because I only
10As Rosen (1986) discusses, workers can also be expected to sort based on the risks associated with jobs. See
DeLeire and Levy (2004) for empirical evidence of such sorting.
11The original NLSY oversampled disadvantaged youth and a members of the military. These samples were reduced
over the years, so attrition from these groups is higher.
10look at employed respondents, the usab l es a m p l es i z ei ss o m e w h a ts m a l l e r .
In each year, I use responses relating to the job that the NLSY determined to be the respondent’s
“main job.” This is the job at which he worked the most hours at the time of the interview or,
if the person is not working at the time of the interview, it is the last job he held (as long as he
worked there after the previous interview.) Table 1 provides summary statistics of key demographic
and employment variables in the NLSY sample. I use a total of 82,555 observations from 10,658
workers, with any given worker providing up to thirteen observations. The summary statistics do
not apply to each of the individual analyses that follow, because some of the relevant questions
were not asked each year.
Just under half the observations are women and just over half are married. About 60% of the
observations are people with children, with the average respondent having 1.2 children at the time
of an interview.12 Naturally, given that the sample ages over time, this average (as well as the
marriage rate) varies across years in the sample. Fewer than 40% of 1985 respondents had children,
while almost 80% of those interviewed in 2000 had at least one child. This aging and changing
demographics could complicate the empirical analysis in that controls for year could also control
for aging of the sample. I attempt to minimize this eﬀect throughout the following analysis by
always controlling for a full set of age indictor variables so that the year eﬀects should pick up, for
example, diﬀerences between thirty-year-old workers in 1989 and 1990.
The NLYS includes a measure of the unemployment rate in the local labor market for each
person in the sample. The measure is crude, however, revealing only whether the unemployment
rate is 0-3%, 3-6%, 6-9%, etc. Most of the variation in this variable is explained by person ﬁxed
eﬀects and year eﬀects. That is, the unemployment rate does not change much in local markets
during the sample, except as it moves up and down with national trends. Therefore, after controlling
for year, this variable is largely a crude region indicator variable.
The “employees” row shows the number of employees at the site where the respondent works.
The NLSY has other measures of ﬁrm size, such as whether the employer has multiple locations
and the total number of workers at all the employer’s locations. I use employees at the worker’s
site for most of the analysis. The results are not sensitive to using alternative proxies for ﬁrm size.
Section 3.7 discusses this and alternative interpretations to the ﬁrm size results.
Over 90% of the sample regularly works 30 hours/week or more, with 67% reporting working
30 to 40 hours per week (“full-time”) and 27% working more than 40 hours/week (“more than
full-time”). The median wage is about $9/hour (real $1990) and the average is considerably higher.
12In the analysis that follows, I use the children indicator rather than the number of children. The results are not
s e n s i t i v et ot h i sc h o i c e .
11Table 1 displays the fraction working in industries related to the employee beneﬁts I analyze because
these industries can presumably provide these beneﬁts at low cost.
The last four rows of the sample show the fraction of employees who reported that their employer
oﬀered various beneﬁts. In 1988, 1989, and 1990, the NLSY asked respondents if their employer
made “company paid or subsidized meals” available to them. Approximately 15% of respondents
said their employer oﬀered them this beneﬁt. From 1988-2000, the NLSY asked if respondents’
ﬁrms oﬀered them “company provided or subsidized childcare.” Only 7% said their ﬁrm provided
this beneﬁt.13 Not surprisingly, health-care-related beneﬁts were more common. Over half of the
NLSY sample reported that their employer oﬀered dental beneﬁts and about three quarters said
yes when asked “Does your employer make available to you medical, surgical, or hospital insurance
that covers injuries or major illnesses oﬀ the job?”
3.2 Employer-Provided Meals
M e a l st h a te m p l o y e e sr e c e i v ea tt h ew o r k p l a c ep r e sent an opportunity to investigate all four of the
testable implications of the model. Implication 1 of the model says that ﬁrms with a cost advantage
in providing a beneﬁt (either due to scale economies, tax savings, or simply saving individual eﬀort
of food preparation) will provide that beneﬁt. This suggests employees are more likely to receive
meals from their employer when the ﬁrm is in the food business (that is, surely it is eﬃcient for
restaurants to provide meals to employees) and when the ﬁrm is relatively large, allowing it to take
advantage of scale economies in purchasing (especially in the case of on-site subsidized cafeterias.)
Implication 2 predicts that workers will sort to ﬁrms that provide beneﬁts that they value
relatively highly. To proxy for value to the employee, I include children and marital status. I
would expect people with families to have a higher opportunity cost of dining at the workplace
and, therefore, expect these proxies to be negatively related to on-the-job meals. I also expect
higher-paid workers to be more likely to receive meals at the workplace, as the tax advantages
are greater for these workers. Implication 3 implies that meals will be more common with longer
employment spells.
The hours of work variables are potentially informative about Implication 4 of the model, which
predicts that beneﬁts will be related to employee eﬀort. As the model suggested, beneﬁts that lower
t h ec o s to fe ﬀort are more valuable when greater eﬀort is required. Therefore, Implication 4 predicts
that employer-provided meals will be increasing in hours worked.
The ﬁrst column of Table 2 presents the results of a logit regression that tests these hypothe-
13See McIntyre (2000) for further details on the growth and prevalence of on-site day care.
12ses. The dependent variable is the indicator for whether the person receives employer-provided or
employer-subsidized meals in a given year. The coeﬃcients displayed are the marginal eﬀect on the
probability of receiving this beneﬁt if the explanatory variable increases by one.
The regressions provide support for the relationship between employer-provided meals and ﬁrm
cost of providing beneﬁts (Implication 1). First note that a doubling of the number of employees at
the work site increases the likelihood of the ﬁrm providing meals by approximately one percentage
point. Given a base probability of 15% of receiving meals, this is a large eﬀect. See Section 3.7 for a
more detailed discussion of possible interpretations of the ﬁrm size/beneﬁts relationship. Firms that
are in food-related businesses, such as bakeries and restaurants, are much more likely to provide
meals.
The data are also consistent with employees who value meals more sorting to ﬁrms that provide
them (Implication 2), as both marriage and children are negatively related to workplace meals.
Married workers with non-working spouses are about 20% less likely (3 percentage points on a base
of 15%) to receive meals at work than single workers. Married workers with working spouses are
also less likely than single workers to be oﬀered meals at work, though less likely than married
workers whose spouses do not work. This is consistent with couples where both people are busy
ﬁnding it less personally costly to be at work. Similarly, people with children are much less likely
to be in jobs where they are oﬀered meals. Also, higher wages are associated with workplace meals,
consistent with the tax eﬀects.
The fact that people with longer tenure are less likely to receive meals contradicts Implication
3 of the model. This could be due to the fact that employee preferences for work-related meals are
likely to change as their family status changes.
The logit results on hours worked are consistent with a relationship between beneﬁts and eﬀort
costs (Implication 4). Full-time workers (the excluded category in the logit) are somewhat more
likely to receive meals at work than part-time workers. However, the important eﬀect of hours is
for those who work more than full time. Employees who work more than 40 hours per week have
about a 7% higher likelihood of receiving meals at work than part-time workers and about a 4%
higher likelihood than those who work full time. The coeﬃcients on part-time and more than full-
time are both statistically diﬀerent from zero at better than the 1% level. They are economically
meaningful given an overall employer-provided meal probability of 15%. These results appear even
more striking when compared to later regressions, which will show that employees who work more
than full time are no more likely than full time workers to receive beneﬁts that do not complement
long hours of work.
Given that work-related meals are a key example of how the beneﬁts/eﬀort relationship can
13aﬀect ﬁrms’ purchases, it is worth considering the size of these eﬀects in the overall economy.
Sodexho USA and Aramark are both large providers of meals to U.S. businesses. Aramark, for
example, states in their 2003 10-K statement: “We satisfy the business dining needs of several
million people annually.” Both companies generate several billion dollars of revenue annually in
this segment of the market, with double-digit annual growth. In addition, many work-related
meals are provided by small caterers and restaurants.14 The estimates in Table 2 suggest that
working more than full-time increases employer-sponsored meal probability by about one quarter.
It therefore seems likely that a non-trivial portion of this multi-billion dollar business is related to
the complementarity between meals and eﬀort.
Though not presented here, I ran several other speciﬁcations to probe the robustness of the
results in column 1 of Table 2. First, I performed the analysis using the Chamberlain (1980)
methodology to run ﬁxed-eﬀects (“conditional”) logits. The qualitative conclusions for hours,
wages, tenure, ﬁrm size, and children were the same as those presented in Table 2. However,
eﬀects of variables that do not vary over time for the same person (such as gender) cannot be
identiﬁed. Eﬀects of those where within-person variation is small (such as marital status and
industry) were measured imprecisely. Second, I controlled for weekly, rather than hourly, wages.
This had essentially no eﬀect on the conclusions.
3.3 Child Care
I now consider employer-provided child care. Implication 4, regarding the complementarity between
eﬀort and beneﬁts, operates quite diﬀerently in the child-care context than for meals. Employees
who are primarily responsible for their children seem unlikely to be swayed to work very long hours
as a result of employer-provided child care. However, it is plausible that employer-provided child
care can help some employees increase their working hours, if not to extreme levels. The eﬀort
complementarity idea may apply to child care on the part-time vs. full-time margin rather than in
leading people to work more than full-time.
Column 2 of Table 2 shows the results of logits where the dependent variable is one if the
NLSY respondent reports that his employer provides or subsidizes child care. The explanatory
variables are the same as in Column 1, except that the child indicator now is determined by whether
the respondent lives in a household with a child under the age of seven. The results support the
connection between beneﬁts and ﬁrm cost structures (Implication 1). People who work in industries
that are related to child services are much more likely to get child care through their employers
14Feel free to discuss this issue in more detail with me over a post-seminar dinner sometime.
14and larger employers are far more likely to provide child care.
Child care beneﬁts are also associated with factors that suggest employers search for those
who value this beneﬁt and these employees sort to employers that provide it (Implication 2).15
Women are much more likely than men to get child care beneﬁts and employees with this beneﬁt
have higher paying jobs (possibly due to tax eﬀects). Note, however, that child care beneﬁts are
not signiﬁcantly related to marital status, working status of spouse, or whether the employee has
children.16 This could be because people who plan to have children match to ﬁrms that provide
child care, but do not need this beneﬁt during much of their relatively long tenure on the job.
The results also support Implication 3. Employer-provided child care is more common at longer
tenure jobs (indicating high “T” in the buyers’ club model).
The results are consistent with beneﬁts being used to lower employees’ eﬀort costs (Implication
4). Full-time workers are signiﬁcantly more likely to get child care at work than part time workers.
The 1.3 percentage point decrease in child care probability for part time workers suggests these
employees are about 20% less likely to get work-related child care than full time workers. However,
those who work more than full time are less likely to get work-related child care than those who
work full time. This diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level and the point estimate
indicates a large diﬀerence based on full-time versus more-than-full-time status. Combined with
the results on hours worked and employer-provided meals, the importance of using beneﬁts to aﬀect
eﬀort costs is well supported by the data. The results are consistent with the idea that employers
provide child care to ease the transition from part-time to full-time work and they provide meals
to make it easier for employees to work long hours.
Finally, employer-provided child care is more common in more competitive labor markets. An
increase of 3% in the local unemployment rate is associated with a one percentage point reduction
in child care probability (or about a one-seventh reduction.) This provides some suggestive evidence
that is consistent with Implication 3 in that it could indicate that, when labor markets are tight,
ﬁrms use child care to increase labor supply by helping to ease the transition from part-time to
full-time work.17 In unreported regressions, I found further suggestive support for this hypothesis
15A similar alternative interpretation is that ﬁrms begin to oﬀer child care assistance when they ﬁnd that they
have employees who would value this beneﬁt.
16For the child care analysis, I set the child indicator equal to one if there is a person under the age of seven residing
in the respondent’s household. Results are similar when the child indicator is one if the respondent has any children.
17As noted above, the unemployment variable is very crude and does not vary much independently of the national
economy. It does, however, indicate which labor markets are generally competitive. If child care were added and
dropped regularly by ﬁrms and if this labor market measure were more accurate, the negative coeﬃcient could imply
15by interacting the unemployment variable with the hours variables. The hours eﬀects are signiﬁ-
cantly larger when unemployment is low — that is, an unemployment/part-time interaction variable
is positive, an unemployment/more-than-full-time interaction is negative, and both are at least
marginally signiﬁcant.
Again, I ran several other speciﬁcations to probe the results in Column 2 of Table 2. Fixed-
eﬀects logits led to similar conclusions to those presented, though the “greater than full-time”
hours eﬀect was no longer negative. This seems reasonable, as few people go from working very
long hours to taking much responsibility for taking care of their children. On the other hand, in a
speciﬁcation controlling for weekly (rather than hourly) wages, the negative relationship between
long hours and child care is stronger and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. I also ran a
speciﬁcation interacting marriage with children, but this did not generate results that reconciled
the family variables with Implication 2. There is no evidence that single parents sort to jobs with
child-care, for example.
3.4 Dental and Health Insurance
The largest beneﬁt given to US employees, in terms of likelihood of receiving it and cost to ﬁrms
is health insurance.18 This is as much by historical accident and due to institutional factors as it
is a reﬂection of any sort of optimal allocation of resources. Nevertheless, given the tax incentives
and opportunities to use such a high-cost beneﬁtt oa ﬀect the employment relationship, it is well
worth studying determinants of health insurance provision.19
Health insurance, as well as dental insurance, can help shed light on the relationship between
beneﬁts and eﬀort because they are diﬀerent in important ways from employer-provided meals and
child care. It seems unlikely that either of these beneﬁts is complementary to employee eﬀort or
hours of work (that is, I would expect ceb =0 ). It does not seem likely that the value of this
beneﬁt should be related to an employee’s marginal product. Therefore, if insurance also shows
diﬀerent prevalence for full-time workers and more-than-full-time workers, I would suspect that the
ﬁrms cut this beneﬁt when wages are rigid (as suggested by Oyer (2005).) However, this does not appear to be the
case, based on unreported conditional logit regressions.
18This statement is somewhat dependent on the deﬁnition of employee beneﬁts. Employer-provided health insurance
is about as common in the NLSY as paid vacation. However, I am thinking of paid vacation as aﬀecting the timing,
rather than the form, of compensation.
19There is a large literature on health insurance and its eﬀects on the U.S. labor market. Many of these issues are
beyond the scope of this analysis. For further institutional detail on U.S. employer-provided health insurance and its
eﬀects on the labor market, see Gruber (2000).
16results with regard to work hours for child care and meals are not driven by forces captured in the
model. As columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 show, however, there is no meaningful diﬀerence in insurance
likelihood between full-time and more-than-full-time employees.20 This suggests that the provision
of insurance is not driven by an attempt to aﬀect eﬀort.
As might be expected, the results are highly consistent with the relationship between beneﬁts
and employer costs (Implication 1). Working in a related industry (low cost of providing beneﬁt) or
for a large ﬁrm (which helps amortize the ﬁxed cost of establishing a program and creates greater
economies of scale) are strongly positively related to health and dental beneﬁts. A 10% increase
in ﬁrm size increases dental probability by 0.86 percentage points (which is a 1.5% increase on the
unconditional 56% probability of having dental insurance.)
The predicted relationship between beneﬁts and employee sorting (Implication 2) is also sup-
ported by the data, though some of the results are ambiguous in this regard. Higher pay (which
proxies for tax rate) is associated with both beneﬁts. Married workers, who may want to get
beneﬁts for the rest of their family, are far more likely to be oﬀered health insurance. This relation-
ship is limited to those with working spouses in the case of dental insurance, which could indicate
these couples have relatively good jobs. Married workers may also have higher likelihood of being
oﬀered insurance because their employment relationships are more stable. However, people with
children are less likely to receive these beneﬁts than those with no children. This could be because
some children are covered by spouses’ insurance. In fact, when not controlling for marriage (in an
unreported logit), children are associated with much higher rates of health insurance coverage.
Implication 3 receives strong support from the logit results, as tenure is related to notably higher
rates of insurance. An extra year of tenure raises the probability of dental and health beneﬁts by
about one to two percentage points each.
These results are all robust to alternative speciﬁcations. For example, ﬁxed-eﬀects logits lead
to similar conclusions, as do controlling for weekly wages. Also, limiting the sample to one gender
or the other does not change the relationships with other variables.
3.5 Beneﬁts Packages
The model and discussion to this point suggest two broad classes of justiﬁcations for ﬁrms’ choices
about which beneﬁts to oﬀer — some ﬁrms compile beneﬁts to encourage long hours (Implication 4 of
t h em o d e l )a n ds o m ec o m p i l eb e n e ﬁts to encourage costs savings and long employment relationships
(Implications 1-3). As the model suggests, these justiﬁcations can reinforce one another. However,
20More-than-full-time employees are more likely to be oﬀered health insurance than full-time employees. However,
the diﬀerence is quite small economically.
17if ﬁrms where eﬀort and beneﬁts complement one another are not those with comparative advantage
in purchasing, these two justiﬁcations can be quite distinct. To more directly assess this distinction,
I now look at groups of beneﬁts oﬀered by individual employers.
The NLSY asks for details on several other beneﬁts that can be used to deﬁne beneﬁts packages.
I start by forming an “eﬀort package” that consists of beneﬁts that are good candidates to help
lower the cost of eﬀort. That is, in the terminology of the model, I expect these beneﬁts to have
ceb < 0. Unfortunately, the NLSY does not ask about many of the beneﬁts (such as concierge
service, game rooms in the oﬃce, etc. — see the quote at the beginning of the paper) that are
most likely to complement eﬀort and keep people at the workplace. I therefore deﬁne an indicator
variable “eﬀort package” that takes the value one if the employee has access to employer-provided
meals, employer-provided parking, and ﬂexibility in choosing work hours.
The NLSY asks about a variety of more traditional beneﬁts that can help attract employees
for a long relationship. I deﬁne a “tenure package” indicator that equals one if the employee’s ﬁrm
provides health insurance, dental insurance, maternity leave, on-the-job training, life insurance,
and a retirement plan.21
Panel A of Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for each package, as well as each beneﬁt
within the package. One thing that is immediately clear from the table is that there is signiﬁcant
correlation across these beneﬁts for a given person. That is, the 8.3% (30.7%) of people who have
each element of the eﬀort (tenure) package is almost double (six times) the fraction that would
have all these beneﬁts if they were provided completely independently of each other.22 However, as
Panel B shows, the correlation between the eﬀort and tenure packages is not particularly noteworthy.
W h i l e8 . 3 %o fp e o p l eh a v et h ee ﬀort package, 11.9% of those who get the tenure package also get
the eﬀort package. Similarly, while 26.1% of the relevant sample gets the tenure package, 37.3% of
those who get the eﬀort package also get the tenure package. While these numbers suggest these
two groups of packages are related, the correlation is far from overwhelming. This provides some
initial evidence that these types of beneﬁts ﬁta td i ﬀerent types of ﬁrms.
Table 4 shows the results of logits similar to those in Table 2, but with the two packages as
dependent variables. Column 1 presents the results for the eﬀort package. Not surprisingly, the
21On-the-job training and retirement plans do not necessarily meet the basic criterion I stated earlier that a beneﬁt
would be something the person got from the ﬁrm that it could also buy externally. However, both these beneﬁts
could meet that deﬁnition and, given the correlation in beneﬁts within ﬁrms, are probably more likely to meet it
when provided as part of a large package of beneﬁts.
22That is, if the components of the eﬀort package were provided independently, roughly 4.3% (15.1% * 58.5% *
48.4%) of respondents would have the full package.
18results are similar to the meals logit, given meals are a third of the package. Two results are worth
highlighting. First, the greater-than-full-time indicator is again large (and statistically signiﬁcant).
The part-time indicator is not distinguishable from the less-than-full-time group, though this could
be due to the small sample of less-than-full-time workers. These results mean that Implication 4 is
consistent with the relationship between hours worked and availability of the eﬀort package.
Second, there is no relationship between eﬀort-related beneﬁts and tenure. These beneﬁts do
not seem to be about attracting people who place a high value on a particular beneﬁt and, therefore,
stay with the ﬁrm. Rather, they appear to help induce high eﬀort during the employee’s stay at
the ﬁrm, however long that may be.
Column 2 of Table 4 shows that these two results reverse when looking at the tenure package.
That is, for these beneﬁts where I would not expect beneﬁts to lower the cost of eﬀort (and,
therefore, would not expect Implication 4 to hold) there is no diﬀerence between the likelihood
of getting this group of beneﬁts for those working full-time and those working very long hours.
Implications 1-3 are consistent with the results for the tenure package, however. These beneﬁts are
strongly associated with relatively long-term jobs. This suggests that these beneﬁts are packaged
together to take advantage of ﬁrm buying power and to attract people who place a relatively high
value on the beneﬁts.
3.6 Beneﬁts at Government and Non-Proﬁt Organizations
Conventional wisdom suggests that people work for government and non-proﬁt organizations be-
cause these employers tend to oﬀer generous beneﬁts. A commonly heard justiﬁcation for taking
jobs outside the private sector is, “The pay stinks, but the beneﬁts are good.” In this section,
I extend the prior analysis to consider the type of ﬁrm. I show that non-proﬁt and government
employers are, in fact, much more likely to provide certain types of beneﬁts than private ﬁrms and
Ic o n s i d e rh o wt h i sﬁts with the theoretical analysis above.
At least based on a stereotypical view that government work is stable and that government jobs
are not high stress, government organizations should be relatively unlikely to use beneﬁts to lower
eﬀort costs. In addition, there may be political constraints that restrict government organizations
from providing perquisites such as meals. Therefore, I expect meals, child care, and the eﬀort
package to be less prevalent at government employers.
Because of their size and potential power in procurement, government employers are likely to
be able to take advantage of scale economies in purchasing insurance. Also, people who choose the
stability of government jobs are likely to be risk averse and, therefore, to value insurance. That is,
Implications 1-3 should apply at government organizations, suggesting dental and health insurance,
19as well as the tenure package as a whole, will be relatively common for government workers.
Self-employed workers may have just the opposite proﬁle — they are likely to be relatively risk
tolerant and they cannot take advantage of scale economies in purchasing insurance.23 In addition,
self-employed workers may have less tax incentive to purchase health insurance, as they may be able
to shield their income from taxes in other ways. Therefore, I would expect self-employed workers
to be less likely to receive employment-related insurance. Self-employed workers have more to gain
than other workers by providing meals at work. This is one way to shield income from taxes, for
example. Also, a self-employed person need not worry as much about the variety of food preferences
of a large group when purchasing meals.
Table 5 displays the results of logits similar to those in Tables 2 and 4, except I include indicator
variables for working for the government, for being self-employed, and for working for a non-proﬁt
organization. The excluded category in all regressions is private company, so the coeﬃcients show
the diﬀerence in probability between each type of employer and a private company. Note that I
limit the analysis, when possible, to 1994 and later. From the start of the survey until 1993, the
NLSY asked respondents if they worked for a private company, worked for the government, or were
self-employed. Starting in 1994, the option of non-proﬁt organization was added. Before 1994,
non-proﬁt employees were classiﬁed as working at private companies.
The meal logit in column 1 conﬁrms that government workers are signiﬁcantly less likely to
receive meals at work than people who work for companies, while self-employed workers are much
more likely to get meals at work. Column 2 shows that government workers are somewhat less likely
to get child care at work, though the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant. Employees of non-proﬁt organizations,
on the other hand, are much more likely to have employer-provided child care. This is not simply
due to the fact that child care and child service providers are often non-proﬁt agencies, because
the regressions control for child-oriented businesses. Perhaps this connection between non-proﬁts
and child care reﬂects that some new parents who want to continue working move to the non-proﬁt
sector because they ﬁnd the “work-life balance” better (which is a way to interpret this result as
consistent with Implication 2). Non-proﬁt employers would then ﬁnd it eﬃcient to set up a child
care center given this common preference. However, there is not enough detail in the data to
investigate this conjecture fully.
C o l u m n s3 ,4 ,a n d6c o n ﬁrm that the beneﬁts at government and non-proﬁt jobs are generous.
Employees in both these sectors are much more likely to get insurance at work, as well as to
have the entire tenure package. The results are statistically signiﬁcant at any reasonable level and
economically large. For example, while 56% of the sample as a whole receives dental insurance, this
23The NLSY sample of self-employed workers only includes those whose business is incorporated.
20probability is increased by nineteen (twelve) percentage points for government (non-proﬁt) workers.
Also, self-employed workers are dramatically less likely to grant themselves these beneﬁts.24 The
results are consistent with Implication 2 of the model. That is, if employees with strong preferences
for insurance (those who are relatively risk averse) are also those who like the stability of government
and non-proﬁt jobs, then these organizations may be able to cost eﬀectively employ these workers.
Column 5, on the other hand, shows that government workers are far less likely than corporate
employees to be provided with beneﬁts that are conducive to increased eﬀort.
3.7 Alternative Hypotheses and Historical Trends
I have argued that the empirical patterns in the NLSY are driven by factors modeled in Section
2, including that workers sort to ﬁrms that cost-eﬀectively provide beneﬁts they value and that
some beneﬁts lower the cost of employee eﬀort. In this section, I brieﬂy consider a few alternative
explanations and I use an alternative dataset to look at historical changes in beneﬁts (and to probe
for potential weaknesses in the NLSY.)
The results regarding ﬁrm size are, as I have argued above, consistent with the importance of
economies of scale in purchasing (and, therefore, Implication 1 of the model). However, as a large
literature shows (see Oi and Idson (1999)), ﬁrm size is correlated with wages even when including
extensive control variables. Therefore, there could be some omitted factor that causes large ﬁrms to
have both high wages and generous beneﬁts. In fact, given the positive ﬁrm size/wage relationship,
I would expect a positive ﬁrm size/beneﬁts relationship simply because employees at larger ﬁrms
would consume some of the extra compensation in wages and some in beneﬁts. I therefore think
of the results that relate ﬁrm size to beneﬁts as a necessary, but not suﬃcient, condition for the
economies of scale relationship suggested by Implication 1 of the model.
I also found that, when combining various measures of ﬁrm size (speciﬁcally, employees at the
respondent’s site, whether the ﬁrm has other locations, and whether the ﬁrm has 1,000 or more
employees at other locations), each of these measures is almost always positively and signiﬁcantly
related to the provision of any beneﬁt. So I cannot speciﬁcally isolate whether it is economies of
scale at the ﬁrm or establishment that lead ﬁrms to provide beneﬁts.
One other potential worry with the ﬁrm size variable is that the functional form assumption
(log of employees at the worker’s location) is inappropriate and, therefore, it does not fully control
24As discussed by Gruber and Poterba (1994), before the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the tax advantages of
employment-based health insurance were lower for self-employed workers than others. However, because the results
in columns 3, 4, and 6 are for 1994 and later, they should be free of eﬀects of tax diﬀerences between self-employed
workers and others.
21for ﬁrm size. This could lead to inappropriate conclusions about other variables that are related to
ﬁrm size. However, while I cannot fully rule that possibility out, it is reassuring that none of the
other conclusions are sensitive to any alternative controls for ﬁrm size. Speciﬁcally, I reran all the
analysis with no controls for ﬁr ms i z ea n dt h e nc o n t r o l l i n gf o rv arious alternative functions of ﬁrm
size. This never aﬀected any conclusions.
In addition, I ran an alternative speciﬁcation that provides support for the economies of scale
interpretation of ﬁrm size. If economies of scale are an important part of the ﬁrm size/beneﬁts
relationship, I would expect this relationship to be weaker at ﬁrms that already have a cost advan-
tage because of their industry. For example, while any ﬁrm that is larger might have an advantage
in providing meals, the marginal eﬀect of being large is likely to be greater at a law ﬁrm than at a
restaurant. I therefore also reran all the analysis with the control for ﬁrm size interacted with the
variable for being in a related industry (restaurants and food stores in column 1 of Table 2, child-
care centers in column 2, etc.) In the case of all four beneﬁts in Table 2, the data are consistent
with the economies of scale interpretation. The coeﬃcient on ﬁrm size is always positive, as is the
coeﬃcient on working in a related industry. But the coeﬃcient on the interaction between size and
related industry is negative and signiﬁcant in each case.25
An alternative explanation for ﬁrms oﬀering some beneﬁts is agency problems. Lavish corporate
beneﬁts, or perquisites, are often cited as a classic example of agency problems for executives (see
Yermack (2005).) Perhaps some employees in the NLSY are also in a position to capture rents and
this is easiest to do by getting the ﬁrm to add perks. Agency seems like an unlikely explanation for
the components of the “tenure package” because non-discrimination laws require that most of these
beneﬁts be provided to all employees if they are available at all. Similarly, it is hard to imagine
this explains the patterns in child-care provision because employees trying to balance work and
family concerns are unlikely to be well positioned to extract rents from the ﬁrm. However, this
could explain the results regarding meals if employees who work long hours are relatively powerful.
If this were the case, one might imagine that this agency issue would be a bigger problem at large
ﬁrms with higher monitoring costs. In an unreported regression, I reran the analysis in column 1
of Table 2 and found that an interaction of greater than full time and ﬁrm size has a marginally
signiﬁcant negative relationship to meals.
Another alternative explanation is that ﬁrms add and remove beneﬁts to adjust to the economic
climate because it is easier to adjust beneﬁts than to change wages (see Oyer (2005).) This is
consistent with some of the results in Table 2, as the negative coeﬃcients on local unemployment
25The interaction coeﬃcient is marginally signiﬁc a n ti nt h ec a s eo fh e a l t hc a r e ,b u ts i g n i ﬁcant at better than the
1% level for the other three beneﬁts.
22s u g g e s tt h a tb e n e ﬁts are higher when labor markets are tighter. This could be a contributing
factor. However, low adjustment costs of beneﬁts alone cannot explain the other factors that aﬀect
beneﬁts, such as hours worked, wages, and tenure.
To see how beneﬁts have changed over time and to insure there are not serious weaknesses in
the NLSY, I gathered data from three surveys of workers from the 1970’s. The 1970 Survey of
Working Conditions and the 1973 and 1977 Quality of Employment Survey each asked approxi-
mately 1,500 workers many detailed questions about their primary job. The three surveys asked
similar questions and I refer to the three surveys together as the QES. When asking about beneﬁts,
the QES speciﬁcally asked if the employer makes the beneﬁt available to the respondent. As with
the NLSY, there is no requirement that the person take advantage of the beneﬁt. To maximize
comparability with the NLSY, I drop QES respondents that are over 45.
Like the NLSY, the QES asked about free or discounted meals and health insurance for medical
issues not related to work. I use the same components to form the “tenure package” as I used
in the NLSY except maternity leave. The QES only asked women this question. The proportion
of workers reporting employer-provided meals and health insurance, as well as those reporting the
“tenure package” closely match those in the NLSY. The QES asked if the ﬁrm provided a day-care
center, which is a little more speciﬁc than the NLSY question of whether the ﬁrm provides or pays
for day care. Probably because of this diﬀerence in the question and because there are fewer women
in the QES (24%), the day care rate is much lower (2.2%) than in the NLSY. The QES did not ask
about dental beneﬁts. Also, it did not ask about parking, ﬂex time, or other beneﬁts that could
help form an “eﬀort package.”
I was able to construct most of the same explanatory variables that I used in the NLSY logits.
The industry classiﬁcations are somewhat diﬀerent in the 1970 sample, so the controls for related
industry are measured with more error in that year. The QES does not include a measure of local
labor market conditions. Analyses similar to those in Tables 2 and 4, but using the QES data,
are displayed in Appendix Table 1. I do not discuss them in detail, but simply highlight a few
conclusions relative to the NLSY results.
The connection between hours worked and meals is the most interesting result in the QES meals
analysis. Conﬁrming one of the main ﬁndings of the NLSY analysis, employees who work more
than full time are more than 4% more likely to receive meals than those that work full time. This
suggests that eﬀort complementarity is important in the provision of meals. However, in the QES,
employees who work part time are signiﬁcantly more likely to be oﬀered meals at work than those
who work full time. While this eﬀect is substantial and signiﬁcant, note that under 9% of the
sample worked part time. The positive eﬀect of part time is the result of ten people in the 1970 and
231973 surveys who worked part-time in general merchandise stores or as domestic help. So, though
part time workers may have been more likely to have work-related meals in the early 1970’s, this
aﬀected a small portion of the workforce and was no longer true as the nature of retail stores and
domestic help changed over time. If I applied a broader deﬁnition to “food-related” industries, the
results in the QES would mimic those in the NLSY. As it is, the 1977 results do mimic the NLSY
while the earlier results conﬁrm the eﬀect of working long hours but change the result for part-time
employees.
The child-care results are not very enlightening, possibly because of how few women there are
in the sample and/or because this beneﬁt was much less common at the time of the QES. The
health care and tenure package logit results are very similar for the QES and the NLSY except that
women were no more likely to get these beneﬁts in the QES. This increase in female beneﬁts by
the time of the NLSY could be due to women’s increased attachment to the labor force and their
ability to obtain higher quality jobs.
In general, the conclusions from the NLSY data are robust to using data from the QES as an
alternative. The changes are what might be expected, given the increase in women’s labor force
participation during the 1970’s and 1980’s.
4 Conclusions and Further Research
One of the “make or buy” decisions nearly every ﬁrm faces is how much to simply “buy” labor input
with salary and how much to “make” employee beneﬁts that it can barter for labor services. In
this paper, I analyzed several factors that go into this choice about ﬁrms’ boundaries. I developed
am o d e lw h e r eﬁrms do some of their employees’ purchasing for them when the ﬁrm can more
eﬃciently procure some items and where employee valuations of beneﬁts vary with work-related
eﬀort. Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, I showed empirical evidence that is con-
sistent with these theoretical considerations playing a role in ﬁrms’ decisions about which beneﬁts
to provide. For some key beneﬁts that make up the bulk of beneﬁts expenditures (especially health
insurance), the eﬃcient purchasing model appears to be particularly important. The relationship
between beneﬁts and employee eﬀort is strongest for company-provided meals and child care. These
are both large and growing portions of the economy, which suggests that “eﬀort complementarity”
of beneﬁts will become more important in the overall economy in coming years.
Given the reduced-form nature of the analysis and the lack of an experiment that can help
evaluate policy, the results in this paper do not have direct public policy implications. However,
given that beneﬁts continue to be a growing portion of employment costs and that sectors such
24as work-related catering are a growing share of the economy, the paper does suggest that policy
makers should consider how ﬁrms’ choice of beneﬁts will respond to any change in tax policy,
overtime rules, or other policies that aﬀect the structure of employment costs. For managers, the
paper highlights the potential value that can be created in the employment relationship by crafting
beneﬁts packages that combine a ﬁrm’s cost structure with employees who value certain beneﬁts.
The comparative statics derived in this paper and the empirical relationships provide some
evidence to suggest factors that aﬀect ﬁrms’ decisions on provision of beneﬁts. One limitation of
the analysis is that I have relied on individuals’ self-reported beneﬁts’ eligibility. To more closely
tie beneﬁts to ﬁrm characteristics and to minimize measurement error, it would be informative to
use a survey of ﬁrms and their beneﬁts practices.
Finally, in this paper I did not address one important issue in employee beneﬁts — overcon-
sumption. That is, one of the costs of ﬁrms’ providing beneﬁts to employees is that, if employees
pay no marginal cost to receive a beneﬁt, they will consume to the point where the marginal value
of their beneﬁts consumption is zero. Given that the social optimum would be for employees to
consume until marginal value equals marginal cost (to the ﬁrm), there will be a deadweight loss
from overconsumption. See Marino and Zabojnik (2004) for a theoretical analysis of the optimal
“price” ﬁrms should charge workers who consume beneﬁts. Future research could gather detailed
beneﬁts usage data from individual ﬁrms to study how ﬁrms manage the trade-oﬀ between the
value created by beneﬁts and the cost of overconsumption.
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27Table 1: NLSY Summary Statistics
mean median standard deviation sample size
Female 47.0% na na 82,555
Married 52.2% na na 82,555
Spouse works 74.1% na na 43,058
Children indicator 61.2% na na 82,555
# children 1.225 1 1.259 82,555
Local unemployment 6-9% 3-6% na 81,051
Employees 1,981 50 12,195 79,832
P a r t - t i m e 6 . 2 % n an a8 2 , 5 2 9
More than full-time 27.3% na na 82,529
Tenure (weeks) 201.1 123 211.7 81,499
Hourly wage ($1990) $16.26 $8.60 $397 82,555
Age 31.26 31 4.67 82,555
Food industry 8.1% na na 23,703
Child-related industry 4.6% na na 69,868
Dental industry 0.5% na na 82,261
Health-related industry 8.4% na na 82,555
Meals provided 15.1% na na 23,703
Child care provided 7.2% na na 69,868
Dental insurance 56.2% na na 82,261
Medical insurance 75.8% na na 82,555
Sample includes 82,255 person/year observations (from a total of 10,658 people) who hold a job and
provided a positive wage. Years are 1986-1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000. Samples size varies (here and in
the following tables) because respondent did not answer or the question was not asked each year. “Spouse
works” indicates that the respondent’s spouse worked at least 1,000 hours in the calendar year preceding the
interview. “Local unemployment” is provided in 3% bands (that is, either 0-3%, 3-6%, etc.) “Employees”
is the number of employees at the establishment where the respondent works. “Part-time” indicates people
w h ou s u a l l yw o r kf e w e rt h a n3 0h o u r sp e rw e e ka tt h e i rm ain job. “More than full-time” includes people who
usually work more than 40 hours per week at that job. “Food industry” includes stores that sell food and
restaurants, “child-related industry” includes elementary and secondary schools, day care services, residential
care facilities, and social services, “dental industry” includes dentist oﬃces, and “health-related industry”
includes doctors’ oﬃces, hospitals, nursing homes, and health services.
28Table 2: Factors Associated with Beneﬁts
(1) — meals (2) — child care (3) — dental (4) — health
Female 0.0019 0.0183 0.0705 0.0286
(0.0063) (0.0032) (0.0081) (0.0046)
Local unempl -0.0003 -0.0095 -0.0166 -0.0058
(0.0037) (0.0015) (0.0038) (0.0021)
Children indic. -0.0219 0.0004 -0.0324 -0.0371
(0.0065) (0.0027) (0.0081) (0.0048)
Married -0.0307 -0.0059 -0.0004 0.0425
(0.0101) (0.0047) (0.0111) (0.0067)
Spouse works 0.0188 0.0046 0.0339 0.0158
(0.0095) (0.0039) (0.0095) (0.0059)
Log employees 0.0086 0.0124 0.0856 0.0558
(0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0019) (0.0013)
Part-time -0.0330 -0.0132 -0.3130 -0.2424
(0.0121) (0.0050) (0.0129) (0.0078)
> than full-time 0.0390 -0.0051 0.0067 0.0330
(0.0060) (0.0030) (0.0071) (0.0042)
Tenure (*100) -0.0052 0.0016 0.0210 0.0364
(0.0019) (0.0006) (0.0022) (0.0015)
Log wage 0.0197 0.0164 0.2464 0.1471
(0.0046) (0.0020) (0.0084) (0.0053)
Related industry 0.1989 0.0444 0.4225 0.0259
(0.0082) (0.0055) (0.0684) (0.0077)
Sample Years 1988-1990 1988-2000 1986-2000 1986-2000
Pseudo-R2 0.058 0.066 0.186 0.2522
Sample Size 21,852 64,021 77,082 77,345
Data are from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Each column reports the results of a logit.
Dependent variables are indicators that equal one if the respondent indicates his/her main employer provides
paid or subsidized meals (column 1), child care (column 2), dental beneﬁts (column 3) or “medical, surgical,
or hospital insurance that covers injuries or major illnesses oﬀ the job” (column 4). Sample includes all
employed people who report their wage and answer the relevant beneﬁts question. Explanatory variables
are described in Table 1. Each regression also includes year and age indicators. Sample years are 1986-1994,
1996, 1998, and 2000, though not all columns include all years (as noted). Standard errors, adjusted for
correlation among multiple responses by the same person, are in parentheses. Coeﬃcients are marginal
eﬀects on the probability that the respondent’s ﬁrm provides the beneﬁt.
29Table 3: Packages of Beneﬁts
Panel A: Summary Statistics
mean sample size
“Eﬀort” package 8.3% 15,914
Meals 15.1% 23,703
Parking 58.5% 15,959
Flex Time 48.4% 15,948
“Tenure” package 30.7% 69,377
Medical insurance 75.8% 82,555
Dental insurance 56.2% 82,261
Maternity leave 62.5% 66,518
On-the-job training 48.6% 70,213
Life Insurance 65.1% 70,423
Retirement plan 59.8% 70,077
Panel B: Relationship between packages (1989 and 1990 only)
No “Tenure” package “Tenure” package Total
No “Eﬀort” package 68.7% 23.0% 91.7%
“Eﬀort” package 5.3% 3.1% 8.3%
Total 73.9% 26.1% 100%
See Table 1 for sample details. Years included are 1986-1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000. Samples are smaller
for some variables because respondent did not answer question or the question was not asked each year.
“Eﬀort” beneﬁts and “Tenure” beneﬁts are indicator variables that equal one for respondents who report
having every one of the beneﬁts in the relevant category. If respondent reports not knowing if he/she receives
ab e n e ﬁt, that beneﬁt is not included when determining if the person receives the relevant “package.” As a
result, package sample size can be bigger than individual beneﬁts a m p l e .
30Table 4: Factors Associated with Beneﬁts Packages
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable “Eﬀort” Package “Tenure” Package
Female 0.0123 0.1144
(0.0054) (0.0069)
Local unempl -0.0030 -0.0214
(0.0036) (0.0035)




Spouse works 0.0145 0.0573
(0.0087) (0.0085)




> than full-time 0.0177 0.0003
(0.0054) (0.0060)
Tenure (*100) -0.0018 0.0145
(0.0016) (0.0015)
Log wage 0.0006 0.1935
(0.0042) (0.0068)
Sample Years 1989-1990 1988-2000
Pseudo-R2 0.0074 0.1674
Sample Size 14,698 65,318
Data are from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Each column reports the results of a logit.
Dependent variables are deﬁned in Table 3 and in the text. See Table 2 for sample and speciﬁcation details.
Standard errors, adjusted for correlation among multiple responses by the same person, are in parentheses.
Coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects on the probability that the respondent’s ﬁrm provides the beneﬁt.
31Table 5: Beneﬁts and Employment Sector
Individual data — NLSY
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
Dependent Variable meals child care dental health “eﬀort” “tenure”
Government -0.0200 -0.0090 0.1916 0.1116 -0.0530 0.1244
(0.0100) (0.0065) (0.0162) (0.0102) (0.0091) (0.0127)
Self-Employed 0.0943 0.0007 -0.3084 -0.1193 0.0335 -0.4466
(0.0278) (0.0126) (0.0291) (0.0133) (0.0252) (0.0474)
Non-Proﬁt 0.0450 0.1166 0.0571 0.1440
(0.0066) (0.0192) (0.0122) (0.0161)
Sample years 1988-1990 1994-2000 1994-2000 1994-2000 1989-1990 1994-2000
Pseudo-R2 0.059 0.071 0.243 0.299 0.013 0.198
Sample Size 21,850 21,263 21,537 21,595 14,696 21,595
Each column reports the results of a logit. Dependent variables in columns (1)-(4) are the same as those
used in Table 2. Dependent variables in columns (5) and (6) are the same as those in Table 4. Control
variables include all those used in Tables 2 and 4. In columns (1) and (5), non-proﬁt organizations are
combined with for-proﬁt entities (which is the excluded variable). Standard errors, adjusted for correlation
among multiple responses by the same person, are in parentheses. Coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects on the
probability that the respondent’s ﬁrm provides the beneﬁt.
32Appendix Table 1: Factors Associated with Beneﬁts
Individual data — SWC and QES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable meals child care health tenure package
Female 0.0255 -0.0046 -0.0194 0.0054
(0.0190) (0.0060) (0.0185) (0.0235)
Children indic. 0.0007 0.0022 0.0171 0.0194
(0.0160) (0.0051) (0.0156) (0.0182)
Married -0.0024 0.0025 0.0307 -0.0147
(0.0214) (0.0064) (0.0201) (0.0235)
Spouse works -0.0127 -0.0083 -0.0203 -0.0039
(0.0185) (0.0059) (0.0185) (0.0203)
Log employees 0.0128 0.0059 0.0587 0.0536
(0.0034) (0.0011) (0.0036) (0.0042)
Part-time 0.0914 0.0037 -0.1961 -0.1836
(0.0256) (0.0098) (0.0273) (0.0528)
> than full-time 0.0442 -0.0048 0.0248 0.0022
(0.0148) (0.0048) (0.0145) (0.0165)
Tenure (*100) -0.0026 -0.0007 0.0161 0.0108
(0.0027) (0.0008) (0.0033) (0.0029)
Log wage -0.0100 -0.0043 0.0581 0.1191
(0.0072) (0.0018) (0.0094) (0.0279)
Related industry 0.2471 0.0142 -0.0447 na
(0.0234) (0.0067) (0.0268)
Pseudo-R2 0.060 0.073 0.230 0.152
Sample Size 2,787 2,729 2,758 2,787
Data are from the 1970 Survey of Working Conditions and the 1973 and 1977 Quality of Employment
Surveys. Each column reports the results of a logit. Dependent variables are indicators that equal one if
the respondent indicates his/her main employer provides paid or subsidized meals (column 1), child care
(column 2), or “medical, surgical, or hospital insurance that covers any illness or injury that might occur to
you while oﬀ the job” (column 3). The dependent variable in column 4 is similar to the “tenure package”
in table 3 except it does not include maternity leave. Sample includes all working people age 45 or under
who report a wage at their main job. Explanatory variables are similar to those in Table 1. Each regression
also includes year and 5-year age indicators. Coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects on the probability that the
respondent’s ﬁrm provides the beneﬁt.
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